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Exogenous Shocks and the 
Dynamics of City Growth: 
Evidence from New York
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
he response of cities and regions to shocks plays a central 
role in our understanding of the spatial organization of 
firms and households, which has been shown to have 
important implications for economic outcomes ranging from 
air pollution to productivity growth. Yet because exogenous, 
unanticipated shocks are rarely observed, efforts to identify 
their effects are often hampered.
This paper empirically examines the spatial and temporal 
responses of the New York City economy to a large, but 
spatially concentrated, exogenous shock to its capital stock: 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Our focus on the 
city’s response allows us to draw inferences about how city 
economies work, rather than to explore the effects of terrorism 
on New York or other cities. We utilize data before and after 
9/11 to study the response because we believe that the size, 
location, and timing of the shock were unanticipated, and 
because the shock was large enough to create substantial 
dislocations in the city’s economy. While the actual financial 
losses produced by the attacks were not large relative to the size 
of the city’s economy, a major element of the shock was the 
perception that the city would be in danger of future attacks.
Our analysis reveals that New York City’s economy was 
surprisingly resilient to the 9/11 attacks and the damage they 
caused, but the shock was associated with significant changes, 
particularly in the spatial distribution of activities. Further-
more, the particular character of the city’s economy and the 
shock it sustained played an important role in the pattern of 
the city’s recovery. We argue that several explanations could 
account for this economic resilience. One is that based on 
previous events, private actors had already reacted to the threat 
of terrorism, and that the events of 9/11 were, in a meaningful 
sense, anticipated. A second possibility is that a repeat of the 
9/11 attacks was regarded as very unlikely. A third possibility 
is that the destruction of the World Trade Center, while 
unanticipated, came amid a disequilibrium in the city’s real 
estate markets and, by chance, happened to reinforce 
preexisting trends. Finally, it is possible that public 
pronouncements, regulation, and planning played a 
substantial role in the economic recovery. Perhaps most 
surprising is this fourth possible conclusion—that government 
could have a positive effect in such a setting. Yet recent work on 
New York City’s real estate markets concludes that regulation 
plays an important role in economic development more 
generally (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2004). Such signals are 
perhaps particularly effective when an economy is out of 
equilibrium, as New York City’s may have been in early 2001.
2. The Effect of 9/11 on New York 
City’s Economy
In the late 1990s, New York City was experiencing 
extraordinarily strong growth for such a mature economy. 
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Chart 1
Employment in New York City
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Between 1996 and 2000, private sector employment in the city 
grew at a 2.6 percent annual rate, the strongest four-year run in 
more than four decades. In each of those years, the rate of city 
job growth exceeded that of the nation. Private sector wage and 
salary growth also exceeded the national average over this 
period, rising 7 percent per year in real terms (Bram 2003). 
This economic strength was reflected in broader measures of 
activity as well. In January 2000, the New York City index of 
coincident economic indicators (CEI), a measure of the short-
run dynamics of economic activity, reached its highest level 
since the series began in 1965.1 City housing values were also at 
very high levels in both absolute terms and relative to the 
nation (Bram, Haughwout, and Orr 2002). Real revenues from 
the city’s four largest taxes reached an all-time high, despite 
rate reductions, in fiscal year 2000-01 (Edgerton, Haughwout, 
and Rosen 2004).
In the subsequent two years, the city experienced a sharp 
economic downturn. Private sector jobs reversed their strong 
growth and, for the 2001-03 period, fell at a 2.1 percent annual 
rate. By November 2003, the CEI had retreated nearly 
10 percent from its peak value. Revenues from the city’s four 
major taxes declined sharply in real terms during fiscal year 
2002, and they had yet to recover their 1999 level by fiscal year 
2003.
The sources of this reversal in the city’s fortunes are not 
controversial: the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the 
decline in the stock market, and the national recession all 
clearly played important roles in the slowing of aggregate city 
economic activity.
2.1 Isolating the City-Specific Component 
of the Shock
The destruction of the World Trade Center had several 
potential effects on the economy of New York. First, and most 
horrific, the attacks took nearly 2,800 lives. In economic terms, 
this means that the human capital stock for the entire 
metropolitan region was reduced, at least in the short run. 
Despite the tragic consequences for the individuals and their 
families, the direct impact on the supply of human capital in 
New York City—an open economy with more than 3.5 million 
jobs and 8 million residents—was small. 
The sixteen acres of the World Trade Center site housed 
approximately 13.4 million square feet of class A office space, 
nearly 30 percent of the Downtown total. This complex was 
destroyed on September 11, and several surrounding buildings 
were damaged when the towers fell. While some residential 
space was affected as well, it was reoccupied relatively quickly. 
As of this writing, the World Trade Center site remains 
essentially vacant, although the reopened PATH station—the 
Lower Manhattan terminus of the Port Authority’s light-rail 
system—occupies a small portion of the area. This persistent 
loss of productive capital and the potential ongoing threat of 
future loss of life and property caused many commentators to 
voice concerns about the future of the city as a highly desirable 
location for businesses and households.
The attacks occurred as a recession was already under way in 
the nation and the city. Employment in New York peaked in 
December 2000 and had declined by 60,000 jobs by August. 
Another 100,000 jobs were lost between August and October 
2001 (Chart 1). The New York City CEI began falling as the 
local recession commenced in January 2001 and declined 
nearly 0.95 percent in September 2001 alone (Chart 2). This 
was the fourth-largest monthly decline in the history of the 
index. While the CEI continued to decline until August 2003, 
the total peak-to-trough decline totaled 8.9 percent, which was 
significantly less deep than those registered during the city 
downturns that began in 1969 and 1989. In addition, the rates 
of decline before September 2001 and after are approximately 
the same, suggesting that the ongoing national recession was an 
important factor in the adverse outcomes experienced by the 
city economy. For this reason, isolating the effect of the city-
specific shock that struck New York on September 11 requires 
controlling, to the extent possible, for the effects of the ongoing 
national recession. In the analysis that follows, we accomplish 
this by normalizing our results by changes in the national 
economy. We thus seek to isolate differential New York City 
effects from changes in the national economy as a whole, 
whether attributable to 9/11 or to other factors.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2005 63
Chart 2
New York City Index of Coincident 
Economic Indicators
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

















New York City Area House Prices 
Relative to U.S. Average
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York calculations.
Note: The index is based on the ratio of the repeat-sales price measure 
for existing single-family homes in the New York City metro area to 
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2.2 The City’s Real Estate Markets
The series depicted in Chart 3 is the quarterly Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) single-family home 
price index for the New York metropolitan area, divided by the 
national index. Both indexes, and the resulting series, are 
indexed to 100 in 1976:2, when the New York series began.
There is little evidence here that the September 11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center reduced the demand for residential 
locations in the New York metropolitan area. The chart shows 
the date of the attacks, which occurred during 2001:3. Repeat-
sale house prices in the metropolitan area were rising faster 
than they were in the rest of the nation both before and after the 
attacks, as depicted by the steady rise in the index on both sides 
of the September 11 point. That is to say, the New York area’s 
residential housing market gained ground on the rest of the 
nation immediately after the attacks. (Statistical tests fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the trend in the series is the same 
before and after 2001:3.) Only after two years had passed, in 
late 2003, was there any sign that housing prices in New York 
had faltered relative to the nation. Since that period, data not 
plotted here suggest that the New York metropolitan area 
housing price premium has resumed its rise. Thus, the relative 
demand for residential locations in the New York area market 
has remained strong since the attacks.
The OFHEO data cover only single-family homes, which are 
presumably located primarily in the suburbs. Increased 
demand for single-family houses may reflect reduced demand 
for Manhattan locations and a decentralization of population 
from New York City proper. Such a result, for example, is 
consistent with the ideas presented in Mills’ (2002) early 
reflections on the implications of urban terrorism. To address 
this issue of urban form, we turn to a detailed examination of 
the New York City housing market before and after the attacks.
2.3 Neighborhood-Level Microdata 
on the City’s Real Estate Markets
Our second housing market analysis is more restrictive in the 
sense that it focuses solely on housing units in the city of New 
York. However, our data source for this analysis, the New York 
City Housing and Vacancy Survey (HVS), allows consideration 
of a much broader range of housing types, from rental 
apartments to condominiums to single-family homes, with the 
mix reflecting the actual housing consumption patterns of city 
households.
The HVS is conducted about every three years (the coverage 
here is 1991, 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002). Each survey collects 
information on the structural and locational characteristics of 
about 18,000 housing units in the city. The structural 
characteristics include detailed items such as the number of 
bedrooms, the presence of complete kitchen facilities, and the 
condition of exterior walls.2 For the purposes of the survey, 
New York is divided into fifty-five sub-boroughs, and the sub-
borough location of each unit is identified in the public data.
The HVS data, like the OFHEO data, provide a limited view 
of changes in housing demand. In particular, the HVS 
complements the OFHEO index in the sense that it allows for a 
detailed look at those parts of the city itself expected to have 64 Exogenous Shocks and the Dynamics of City Growth
Sub-Boroughs of Lower Manhattan 
and Northwest Brooklyn
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
Lower Manhattan
Northwest Brooklyn
been affected most by the terrorist attacks and the fear of future 
attacks. 
To discern the effects of September 11 on the demand for 
housing in New York City, we estimate a set of regression 
equations of the form  , where   is a measure 
of unit value (expected sales price for owner-occupied units or 
gross rent for rental apartments),   indexes time,   indexes 
neighborhood, and   is a vector of housing capital measures.
We interact the fifty-five sub-borough measures with a set 
of five survey (year) dummies. Our test consists of looking for 
significant negative effects on the 2002 dummies in the city as 
a whole or in those sub-boroughs expected to have been 
affected most by the attacks.3 Our specification estimates 
average trait prices and looks for temporal variation in the 
relative value of particular neighborhoods. If variations in traits 
whose prices are changing are correlated with neighborhood, 
then we may obtain biased estimates of neighborhood effects. 
We leave research on this topic to future work, but note that if 
components of housing capital that experienced rising prices 
are concentrated in Lower Manhattan, then we will understate 
the relative depreciation (or overstate the relative appreciation) 
of a Lower Manhattan location per se.
We experimented with several specifications of the basic 
relationships, including estimating the equation in level and 
semi-log forms, eliminating the top and bottom 5 percent of 
observations based on value, eliminating top-coded units, and 
augmenting the equation with information about financial 
arrangements and move-in or lease dates. Each of these 
specifications leads to the same qualitative conclusions.
Results
Table 1 reports the results of two sets of regressions designed to 
identify the effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the 
demand for residential locations in New York City. The figures 
are the regression coefficients on year 2002 dummies either on 
their own (column 1) or interacted with dummies for a 
particular borough (column 2), sub-borough (column 5), or 
group of sub-boroughs (columns 3 and 4). If the attacks were 
to have broken the trend of absolute price and rental growth in 
the city, we would expect negative coefficients to predominate 
in the table. Analyzing the evidence on the city’s appreciation 
relative to that of the rest of the nation requires another step, 
described below.
The first column of the table reports the overall citywide 
trends in prices and rents, controlling (as do all specifications 
reported here) for the units’ structural characteristics. In 
addition, for owner-occupied units, we control for the year in 
VV t N H ,, () =V
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H
which the owner acquired the unit or, for rental units, the year 
the occupant moved in. The requirement that we have 
information for all of these variables reduces the sample size to 
the approximately 51,000 reported in the table. We present 
results from both the level and semi-log specifications.
The results suggest that city residential prices and rents in 
2002 were both higher than they were in 1999, the year of the 
previous survey. But when we subtract the national increase in 
shelter costs, 11.1 percent, only the price increase is statistically 
different from zero; rental increases were slightly slower in 
New York City than they were in the nation as a whole.4 Note, 
however, that we can reject the hypotheses that absolute rents 
and prices in New York fell on average; all four estimates in 
column 1 are positive and more than twice their standard errors.
The second column of Table 1 reports the price changes in 
Manhattan in 2002 relative to 1999, controlling for citywide 
time effects. These results reveal a pattern similar to that in the 
citywide estimates. Although the point estimate of 12 percent 
rental appreciation in Manhattan slightly exceeds the national 
average, the standard error of the estimated coefficient does not 
allow for rejection of the hypothesis that the New York increase 
was the same as the nation’s. Manhattan prices, meanwhile, 
grew much more rapidly than did the shelter component of the 
national CPIU.
Column 3 reports results for the two Lower Manhattan 
sub-boroughs and three Northwest Brooklyn sub-boroughs 
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the Lower Manhattan central business district, with housing 
units typically within a thirty-minute commute on public 
transportation.5 We might thus expect residential markets in 
these areas to be negatively affected by the attacks. Again, the 
data provide little evidence to support this conjecture, although 
rental increases are statistically indistinguishable from zero for 
these areas as a whole.
Since the attacks occurred in Lower Manhattan, there is the 
potential that the area would endure significant reductions in 
demand. Columns 4 and 5 address this issue, using two 
definitions. In column 4, we include the area that extends as far 
north and east as Chinatown, while the column 5 results are 
limited to the Financial District and Greenwich Village. Once 
again, the evidence suggests price increases relative to the 
nation in all these areas as well as significant rent increases in 
the area most proximate to the World Trade Center.
Our tests indicate that demand for rental properties in New 
York was no stronger than demand in the nation, and in some 
areas it may have been weaker. Yet in Lower Manhattan, the 
area most affected by the attacks, rents grew strongly. The 
apparent divergence between the residential rental market in 
Lower Manhattan and that in the rest of the city may be 
partially attributable to incentives for residents to locate 
Downtown, part of the package of aid that the city received in 
the wake of the crisis. Under these programs, residents willing 
to make a two-year residential commitment to areas of Lower 
Manhattan close to the site of the attacks were eligible to receive 
up to $12,000 in grants. Our estimated 1999-2002 rental 
increase in Lower Manhattan (Table 1, column 5) less the 
increase in the city as a whole is about $325 per month, or 
approximately $7,800 over a two-year period. Unfortunately, 
we cannot identify which units receive the subsidy, so a direct 
Table 1











Manhattan Lower East Side
Northwest 
Brooklyn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prices
Dollars 68,714 151,883 102,709 57,771 113,733 -940 130,467
(3,732) (7,244) (11,153) (16,742) (23,465) (23,560) (14,585)
ln 0.77 1.3 1.03 1.23 2.01 0.38 0.8
(0.03) (0.07) (0.1) (0.15) (0.22) (0.22) (0.13)
Monthly rents
Dollars 39.6 169.1 91.1 161 365.4 1.85 14.08
(5.8) (8) (12.2) (16.8) (25.3) (21.9) (16.8)
ln 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.37 -0.06 -0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey.
Notes: The figures in bold represent increases that are significantly greater than national average increases in the shelter component of the CPIU between 
1999 and June 2003 (11.1 percent). The total number of observations for prices is 16,672; the total number for monthly rents is 34,586. All regressions 
include controls for structural traits, survey year, rent control status, whether the unit is a condominium or cooperative (price regressions), whether the 
owner lives in the building (rent regressions), and year acquired (price regressions) or year the current occupant moved in (rent regressions). Rows labeled 
“dollars” are estimated in levels; results reported in rows labeled “ln” are from models in which the dependent variable is a natural logarithm.
For column 1, the coefficient and standard error estimates are on a dummy variable for 2002 prices, relative to 1999 prices. For column 2, the coefficient 
and standard error estimates are on a dummy variable for 2002 Manhattan prices, relative to 1999 Manhattan prices. For column 3, the coefficient and 
standard error estimates are on a dummy variable for 2002 prices in Lower Manhattan, Chinatown and the Lower East Side, and Northwest Brooklyn, 
relative to 1999 prices in the same areas. For column 4, the coefficient and standard error estimates are on a dummy variable for 2002 prices in Lower 
Manhattan and in Chinatown and the Lower East Side, relative to 1999 prices in the same areas. For column 5, the coefficient and standard error estimates 
are on a dummy variable for 2002 Lower Manhattan prices, relative to 1999 Lower Manhattan prices. For column 6, the coefficient and standard error 
estimates are on a dummy variable for 2002 Lower East Side and Chinatown prices, relative to 1999 Lower East Side and Chinatown prices. For column 7, 
the coefficient and standard error estimates are on a dummy variable for 2002 Northwest Brooklyn prices, relative to 1999 Northwest Brooklyn prices.66 Exogenous Shocks and the Dynamics of City Growth
comparison of rent with the value of the subsidy is not possible. 
However, since the majority of the units in Lower Manhattan 
as we define it are eligible for smaller (or no) subsidies, it seems 
most likely that our estimate of the rental increase in the area 
incorporates demand effects above and beyond those 
stimulated by the subsidy.
Of course, the price of any good, including housing, is 
determined by both supply and demand. One potential 
explanation for increased rents (prices) in Lower Manhattan is 
reductions in the current (expected future) supply of units. 
Evidence of the direct effect of the attacks on the housing 
supply is hard to uncover. Table 2 displays the number of new 
housing units added to the Downtown stock from 1995 to 
2004. In Downtown Manhattan, with its paucity of vacant land, 
office building conversions are an important source of new 
residences, as indicated in the table. Also important is a city 
tax-incentive program, adopted in 1995, that offers property 
tax abatements for residential conversions Downtown.
The data are difficult to interpret, as the peak year for new 
units was 2001—the year of the 9/11 attacks. Since the process 
of adding units to the stock takes time, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the vast majority of the 2,578 units that came on 
line in 2001 were planned before the attacks. Nonetheless, 
despite the national recession, the 2002-04 total of 4,167 units 
slightly exceeds the 1999-2001 total of 4,098, indicating little 
effect on the trajectory of the housing supply after 9/11. In 
addition, the 2004 total is the second highest of any year since 
1995. The data, then, do not suggest a significant effect on the 
supply of Downtown residential units. Given that the supply of 
Downtown housing appears to have been changed little by the 
attacks, we interpret our results as strong evidence that the 
demand for residential locations in Lower Manhattan 
remained very robust in the wake of 9/11.
For the other areas potentially affected by the attacks, the 
signals are less clear. Rents in Northwest Brooklyn were 
essentially flat in nominal terms, and thus lagged the national 
average in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Prices, 
however, remained strong, growing at a pace significantly 
faster than the national average. Meanwhile, on the Lower East 
Side, both prices and rents fell relative to the national average. 
This last finding complements earlier evidence that businesses 
in Chinatown, which is in the Lower East Side neighborhood, 
were affected negatively by 9/11-related disturbances in 
transportation and telecommunications infrastructure (Asian 
American Federation of New York 2002). Yet given that these 
were expected to be temporary phenomena—and indeed have 
largely been rectified in the years since 2001—the residential 
price effects we observe are a puzzle. Of course, long-run 
divergences between rents and prices may signal differences 
in current conditions and expectations of future conditions. 
The 2005 HVS, which will be released in 2006, may help answer 
some of these questions.
Some Caveats
We begin by noting that our analysis of the 2002 data is based 
on a comparison with 1999, the previous survey year. Because 
the 2002 survey was based on results from the 2000 decennial 
census, while the 1999 survey relied on the 1990 census, 
variations in the under- or overcount of housing units in the 
census could affect the results. This will only lead to biased 
estimates of the neighborhood effects if changes in the housing 
characteristics of miscounted units are correlated with 
neighborhood. Such a bias would likely appear as a significant 
change in results when sampling weights, which adjusts the 
sample data to match the census population characteristics. 
The results we describe above obtain whether the regression is 
estimated with or without the sampling weights, ameliorating 
this concern to some extent.
It is also possible that the prices and rents we observe in 
2002, while higher than those in 1999, are lower than they were 
immediately before the attacks, a period for which less data are 
available. Analysis of actual transactions for which we have 
prices provides modest support for the contention that real 
prices in Manhattan were stronger in 2002 than in 2001, but the 
number of units in the HVS sample that sold in those two years 
is too small to allow any strong conclusions to be drawn from 
the data. We take some comfort from the fact that the analysis 
Table 2
Downtown Residential Development, 1995-2004
Date Open Conversions New Developments Total by Year
1995 8 0 8
1996 0 0 0
1997 46 0 46
1998 1,454 152 1,606
1999 102 398 500
2000 811 209 1,020
2001 2,139 439 2,578
2002 1,366 25 1,391
2003 545 449 994
2004 867 915 1,782
Totals 7,338 2,587 9,925
Sources: Alliance for Downtown New York; New York City Department 
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Chart 5
Office Price Indexes
Class A Space, Manhattan Markets Relative to National Average
Sources: Global Real Analytics, National Real Estate Index; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York calculations.
Note: The indexes are based on the ratio of office prices in Manhattan 

















Class A Space, Manhattan Markets Relative to National Average
Sources: Global Real Analytics, National Real Estate Index; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York calculations.
Note: The indexes are based on the ratio of office rents in Manhattan 
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Midtown Manhattan
Downtown Manhattan
of annual metropolitan statistical area trends produced 
conclusions broadly consistent with those advanced here.
Finally, the 2002 survey was conducted during the first half 
of the year, or immediately in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of late 2001. Since very little time elapsed between the 
attacks and the beginning of the survey, there is potential bias in 
the survey responses. This bias could be in either direction: 
respondents might not have had time to internalize fully the 
negative effect of the attacks on their property values, and thus 
might have provided an overly optimistic view of value. 
However, Lower Manhattan in the first six months of 2002 was 
still very much in the throes of the turmoil created by the 
destruction of the World Trade Center and a substantial 
amount of city infrastructure (such as roads and subways). 
Indeed, the fires ignited by the attacks were extinguished only in 
late December 2001, and the cleanup of the site continued until 
late May 2002. In these circumstances, the idea that property 
owners would be overly optimistic about the value of their 
homes seems unlikely. Nonetheless, it is impossible to know for 
certain. Again, we take comfort from the fact that the results 
here are consistent with the analysis of the OFHEO price index.
2.4 Office Markets
We now examine trends in the market for office space in New 
York’s two central business districts—Downtown and 
Midtown—using data from the National Real Estate Index.6 
These data are collected for class A office space in sixty markets 
across the nation. We focus on the two New York markets and, 
to control for prevailing national conditions, calculate indexes 
measuring appreciation in these markets relative to the nation. 
These indexes, which are based in 1985:4, are shown in 
Charts 4 and 5.
Note in these charts the trend deterioration of Downtown 
office prices and rents relative to Midtown. In rents, this 
pattern is evident immediately following the commencement 
of the data (Chart 4), although it is most pronounced in the 
price data after 1993 (Chart 5). This reduction in the relative 
premium for Downtown office locations is part of the long-
term trend described by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002).
The September 11 attacks destroyed or rendered 
temporarily or permanently unusable nearly 28 million square 
feet of class A office space, 13.4 million of which was in the 
World Trade Center complex itself. If the demand for Lower 
Manhattan locations remained stable, we might expect to see a 
strong increase in office rents for the remaining Downtown 
office space. There is little evidence of this in Chart 4. Indeed, 
nominal class A office rents declined nearly 9 percent between 
2001:3 and 2002:3, suggesting that demand fell at the same time 
as supply. A decline in demand is consistent with Glaeser and 
Shapiro’s view that the attacks hastened the decline of Lower 
Manhattan as a principal site for New York City office 
locations. Yet this decline was matched by an 8.5 percent 
decline in class A rents nationwide, with the result being that 
both the Downtown and Midtown indexes depicted in Chart 4 
remained essentially flat, with perhaps a modest downward 
trend.68 Exogenous Shocks and the Dynamics of City Growth
Prices reveal an interesting pattern both before and after 
September 11, 2001 (Chart 5). Between 1985:4 and 2003:3, 
Downtown office building prices essentially held steady relative 
to the nation, while they fell relative to Midtown. Note, 
however, that Downtown prices reached a trough in 1998:1 
(at which point, Downtown had fallen more than 10 percent 
relative to the nation since the end of 1985). From 1998:2 to 
2001:2, the Downtown market rallied, and the relative price 
index stood at 111.5 on the eve of September 2001. By the close 
of 2001, the Downtown market had given back all its gains 
relative to the nation, and the index reached a low of 96.8 
in 2002:3. There is modest evidence here of a rally in the 
Downtown market since that point, as the index rose back 
above the break-even point (101.6) by 2003:3.
The fact that the relative Downtown office prices remain 
below the peak they reached immediately prior to the 
September 11 attacks might be taken as evidence that the 
attacks themselves had a very substantial effect on office prices. 
There are several points to make here. First, the 2001:2 peak of 
the office index (111.5) was anomalous in the sense that it 
represented a sharply higher level than it did in the previous 
quarter (103.7). Second, the pre-9/11 rise in the index as we 
measure it was the result of a modest decline in the national 
index and a sharp uptick in the Downtown index.7 That is, the 
chart shows a sharp increase in part because of the national 
office market downturn. Third, the fact that the Downtown 
office market stabilized in the subsequent two years provides 
some indication that demanders continue to find locations 
there attractive. By the end of the period, the relative 
Downtown price index was about 3 percent higher than it had 
been three years earlier. However, there is some evidence, as 
suggested by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), of a post-attack shift 
in demand to Midtown, where prices have rallied strongly 
relative both to the nation and to Downtown since mid-2001. 
Statistical tests indicate that both the level and the growth rate 
of the ratio of Midtown to Downtown prices per square foot of 
office space increased significantly after 2001:3.
Overall, the evidence from the office market suggests a post-
attack weakening of demand in Lower Manhattan relative to 
the rest of the nation, especially in light of the decline in the 
supply of space that accompanied the destruction of the World 
Trade Center. The most dramatic effects are seen in prices 
(Chart 5), although an unusual spike just prior to the attacks 
makes the data difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the dramatic increase in prices that occurred in Midtown has 
not been experienced Downtown. In rental markets, there is 
some sign of weakening in both Downtown and Midtown, 
although there was modest evidence of stabilization in both 
areas by the end of 2003.
These data are consistent with a fairly benign view of the 
attacks’ effect on the demand for New York locations. As 
suggested by Glaeser and Shapiro (2002), it would appear that 
Downtown’s appeal to businesses has declined relative to that 
of Midtown. However, Downtown demand has held up 
reasonably well relative to demand in the nation, especially 
given the temporary dislocations associated with the cleanup 
and redesign of the World Trade Center and surrounding 
areas.
We can calculate the weighted average price increase for all 
of Manhattan by applying the Downtown and Midtown shares 
of class A space as weights to the relevant price increases. That 
calculation yields a 12.6 percent increase in office prices across 
Manhattan between 2001 and 2003.
2.5 Summary
Our evidence suggests several interesting features of the 9/11 
shock on the New York City economy:
• It destroyed a very significant share of the Downtown 
class A office stock.
• The shock exacerbated the effects of the ongoing 
recession, and almost certainly contributed to a sharp 
loss of city jobs in late 2001.
• Long-run demand for city locations relative to the rest of 
the nation appears to have been affected very little; 
modest evidence from aggregate real estate prices 
suggests that it may have continued to strengthen.
• Long-run demand for residential space in Lower 
Manhattan strengthened significantly, but demand in 
the short run was weaker.
• Both long- and short-run demand for office space in 
Lower Manhattan weakened relative to the rest of the 
nation, while demand for Midtown offices rose sharply.
3. Interpreting the Data
What can economic models tell us about what happens to cities 
over time when they experience significant shocks? Previous 
work on the dynamics of city economies in light of factor 
mobility is surprisingly limited. Wildasin (2003) describes a 
model in which at least one factor of production is imperfectly 
mobile in the short run, and explores the dynamic implications 
for tax competition. A key conclusion is that the effect of 
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anticipated shocks have little or no effects. Glaeser and 
Gyourko (forthcoming) examine the implications of capital 
durability for paths of urban growth and decline. Both papers 
indicate that dynamics are very important to the behavior of 
actors and to the interpretation of empirical results.
A few papers provide models that explicitly incorporate 
shocks of the sort we examine here. Harrigan and Martin 
(2002) study simple equilibrium theoretical models of urban 
growth in the face of terrorism. In both models presented, a 
large shock is sufficient to reduce the long-run equilibrium size 
of the city, but the authors argue that large shocks of this type 
are unlikely to occur as a result of terrorism. They conclude 
that the transport cost and labor pooling advantages of urban 
density are likely to be broad and durable enough to absorb 
plausible terrorism shocks in the long run. The models that 
these authors adopt are not designed to examine intracity 
spatial or temporal dynamics, but their results are broadly 
consistent with the evidence from New York.
In a noneconomic approach to the effects of 9/11, Beunza 
and Stark (2003) report the results of an ethnographic study of 
a financial services firm before and after the 2001 attacks. They 
conclude that the organization’s ability to recreate itself was the 
result of a complex interaction of human and technological 
capital. One theme that clearly emerges is the primacy of 
networks across firms and information sharing within the firm. 
These findings suggest that spatial concentration of activities is 
an enduring feature of advanced service economies, even in 
light of sophisticated technologies for transferring and storing 
information. These conclusions support those of Harrigan and 
Martin while adding some empirical detail to the advantages 
conferred by density. One relevant feature of Beunza and 
Stark’s study is that it does not presume that the spatial 
organization of activity on September 10, 2001, was an 
equilibrium allocation, which implies that the dynamics of 
recovery will depend on the expected future configuration as 
well as the particular character of the shock.
The aggregate effect of shocks on the New York City 
economy has been empirically documented by several authors. 
Two kinds of shocks have drawn special attention: the 9/11 
terrorism shock (Haughwout 2005) and changes in city fiscal 
policies (Haughwout et al. 2004). One remarkable feature of 
these studies is the very different responses that the city 
economy exhibits in response to these different kinds of shocks. 
Haughwout et al. find that small changes in tax rates have 
substantial effects on city tax bases, which are themselves 
determined by city economic activity, including employment. 
However, as we indicate, the arguably very large shock caused 
by the attacks of September 11 resulted in very little aggregate 
effect on the city economy, but it seems to have been associated 
with changes in the equilibrium distribution of activities over 
space.
Rossi-Hansberg (2004) provides a dynamic general 
equilibrium analysis of the effect of a terrorist attack on a city 
economy. The paper reaches several conclusions. First, the 
long-run effect of a terrorist attack on the overall size of a city 
is expected to be substantial, with a benchmark simulation 
suggesting that a modestly sized attack would produce city 
output declines of between 12 and 21 percent, depending on 
commuting costs. Second, the new equilibrium spatial 
configuration features no uniform effects on business land 
rents, but uniformly higher residential land rents.
In Rossi-Hansberg’s model, the long-run effect of a terrorist 
attack is determined by what the attack implies about ongoing 
risks of future destruction and the distribution of that threat 
over areas of the city, or what the author refers to as the 
“terrorism tax.” Policy interventions such as subsidies to 
development in areas that are (incorrectly) perceived to be at 
elevated risk of future attacks will improve welfare only to the 
extent that the public sector has special (correct) information 
about the probability of future attacks that it cannot credibly 
convey to private actors.
Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2004) emphasize the 
importance of land use regulations in influencing the level and 
distribution of economic activity in New York. Government’s 
role in providing information that affects development may 
have been an important factor in the case of New York as well, 
although in a different way than those highlighted by Rossi-
Hansberg and Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks. Because 
government plays an important role in determining the 
equilibrium spatial configuration of activity in New York City, 
clear pronouncements about the future equilibrium 
configuration provided market players with information in the 
face of uncertainty. This information appears to have been 
valuable enough to more than offset the terrorism tax that 9/11 
imposed on the city, allowing a relatively smooth transition 
toward the new equilibrium.
3.1 Understanding New York’s 
Response to 9/11
New York’s relatively rapid recovery after 9/11 is a puzzle. How 
could such a large shock result in so little aggregate change in 
the economy after just two years? One possible explanation is 
that while the general public did not anticipate a terrorist attack 
of such magnitude, relevant market actors like property 
developers and their insurers understood that it was a real 
possibility. An example of evidence supporting this argument 70 Exogenous Shocks and the Dynamics of City Growth
is that this was not the first terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center, which had survived an attempt to topple the towers in 
1993. Another possibility is that relevant market actors 
expected that the shock would never be repeated, or that the 
ongoing terrorism tax was very low. Yet neither notion is 
supported by evidence from insurance markets. In the 
immediate aftermath of the attacks, property insurance prices 
soared (Lakdawalla and Zanjani 2005), suggesting that the 
shock was unanticipated and that the perceived probability of 
further attacks had risen.
As we observe, Lower Manhattan on the eve of the 9/11 
terrorist shock was already changing from a primary location 
of the financial services and banking industries, centered on 
Wall Street. As indicated in Charts 4 and 5, Manhattan office 
rents and prices had lagged those in Midtown for at least fifteen 
years. Indeed, public construction of the World Trade Center 
itself in the 1960s was an effort to resuscitate a lagging 
Downtown office market (Glaeser and Shapiro 2002). 
Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s, demand for Manhattan 
residential locations, including Downtown, was strong.
Prior to 9/11, the movement of office employment to 
Midtown was gradual, in part because of a shortage of 
accessible, developable land in Midtown; existing stocks of 
office capital Downtown; and heavy government regulation in 
both markets. Given that only the last of these can be altered in 
the short run, it is useful to think about the spatial allocation 
of activities in Manhattan prior to 9/11 as a disequilibrium.
A critical feature of this disequilibrium is the central role 
played by government in affecting the distribution of activities 
in New York. Industries and occupations that place high value 
on spatially defined networks dominated employment in pre-
9/11 Lower Manhattan. For these firms, the geographic 
characteristics of places are less important than their economic 
and social characteristics. That is, the agglomeration of 
financial services firms that exists in Lower Manhattan could 
potentially be located anywhere within the greater New York 
commuting area, as long as the relevant actors are located 
together. As a preexisting agglomeration begins to come apart, 
firms lack a means of coordinating their new locations so as to 
remain near each other. When the public sector has important 
effects on location patterns, government regulators have the 
tools at their disposal to serve this coordination function.
In this context, the behavior of public officials in the wake of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks had the potential to be a crucial 
determinant of the future level and distribution of activity. 
How did officials respond? The federal government 
immediately pledged $20 billion in aid to reconstruct the city, 
signaling that it was committed to maintaining New York as 
the nation’s primary center of economic activity. City officials 
responded in several ways. In addition to proposing detailed 
plans for the use of the federal money, they made strong and 
repeated announcements about the future of Downtown 
Manhattan as a 24/7 mixed-use community. In addition, city 
officials sought to divert some of the federal resources intended 
for Downtown businesses to businesses located elsewhere in 
the city.8 Finally, Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration 
accelerated the process of developing the far West Side of 
Manhattan, adjacent to Midtown, as a new premium office 
location complete with a new football stadium.
All of these actions served to signal that the city intended 
to accommodate the transformation of Downtown into 
a residential location. This transformation included the 
relocation of financial services jobs from Downtown to 
Midtown. All of these actions, whether intentionally or not, 
provided valuable information to market participants in the 
wake of 9/11. The change from Downtown as a business 
location to Downtown as a residential location proceeded 
slowly, in part because of the existence of large amounts of 
sector-specific capital. The 9/11 attacks destroyed a large 
portion of this durable capital in a short period of time. In the 
market uncertainty that followed, consistent government 
behavior was interpreted as a clear signal that the future 
location for business was Midtown.
This view of the evidence is, we believe, consistent with 
much of the previous literature on city economies. It places 
appropriate weight on the importance of networks and 
spillovers, as emphasized by Beunza and Stark (2003). It also 
stresses the importance of government activities in general 
(Rossi-Hansberg 2004) and in New York (Glaeser, Gyourko, 
and Saks 2004). Finally, it provides a potential explanation for 
the difference between the findings in Haughwout et al. (2004) 
on tax shocks and the relatively small effect of the terrorism tax. 
What distinguishes the two is that in the latter case, govern-
ment is attempting to offset an exogenous shock, while in the 
former, government itself is generating a “surprise,” to use 
Wildasin’s (2003) language. Combined, these results suggest 
that the actions of New York City government are perceived to 
be highly credible, both when they signal preferred patterns of 
land use and when they signal a redistribution of resources.
4.C o n c l u s i o n
The resilience of cities to powerful shocks has been 
documented by many authors. In this paper, we present and 
interpret data on the effects of the September 11 attacks on 
New York City. The New York experience is consistent with a 
significant role for government in resolving uncertainty in the 
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cities’ responses will depend on the size of the original shock 
and its expected ongoing cost (in this case, the terrorism tax), 
whether the preshock spatial configuration was an equilibrium, 
and the importance and effectiveness of public sector actors as 
coordinating agents.
If this conjecture is valid, then a negative shock to capital 
stocks in a city that is in a stable equilibrium will likely reduce 
activity in the short run, but absent a long-run cost, long-run 
levels and the spatial distribution of activity will return to the 
previous equilibrium. But when a city’s spatial configuration is 
far from equilibrium, the shock will potentially exert a stronger 
effect on the spatial distribution of activity in the long run. In 
the case of New York, the fact that the city was not in 
equilibrium, as evidenced by the long-term trends away from 
Downtown as a business location, and that a very influential 
local government provided clear information led to marked 
increases in the Midtown premium for business locations and 
the Downtown residential premium.
In addition to emphasizing the importance of government 
behavior, these results suggest that analysts who study the 
effect of shocks on urban economies take into account the 
potential effects of disequilibrium on the shock’s effects. 
The results also suggest the usefulness of modeling both 
the temporal and the spatial dimensions of the shock.Endnotes
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1. The New York City CEI is a broad-based, dynamic single-factor 
measure of economic activity, constructed according to the 
methodology of Stock and Watson (1989). The index is calculated 
from the common movements in four indicators tied to the city’s 
labor market: payroll employment, the unemployment rate, average 
weekly hours worked in manufacturing, and real earnings. The CEI is 
described more fully in Orr, Rich, and Rosen (1999). 
2. A complete description of the survey is available at <http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/nychvs/2002/nychvs02.html>.
3. Because of high correlations among the measures of unit quality, 
the specifications reported in Table 1 exclude some variables. These 
exclusions have no effect on the coefficients of interest. R2 values for 
the regressions range from 0.72 for the price equations to 0.85 for the 
rent equations. Detailed results are available upon request.
4. All prices and rents are measured in nominal terms. The shelter 
component of the national CPIU increased 11.1 percent between 1999 
and June 2002 (Council of Economic Advisers 2005, Table B-61). 
Since the rental and owner’s equivalent rent components grew at 
similar rates (12.3 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively), we use the 
total as our benchmark; disaggregating would not affect our 
conclusions. Overall CPIU inflation over this time period was 
8.0 percent.
5. Average commutes in New York City outside of Manhattan average 
more than forty minutes, placing the four “outer boroughs” sixth, 
seventh, eighth, and ninth in the national ranking of longest 
commuting times.
6. Global Real Analytics, which produces the index, collects quarterly 
information on recently closed office building sales and average rents 
for class A office space.
7. The price for a square foot of class A office space in Lower 
Manhattan rose from $307 in 2001:1 to an all-time high of $328 in 
2001:3, while the national average fell from $215 to $213. Comparing 
fourth-quarter prices, we note that Downtown prices were 4.8 percent 
higher in 2001 than they were in 2002. 
8. See <http://www.lowermanhattan.info/construction/
looking_ahead/residential_growth.asp>.References
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